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This thesis investigates how the integration of the dual-track social secu-
rity systems in China aﬀects capital accumulation, labor allocation between
the production sector and the public sector, and welfare in an extended AK
model with overlapping generations and externalities from aggregate capital.
It ﬁnds that aggregate life-cycle saving from households in both sectors is
below the eﬃcient level in the presence of capital externalities. The optimal
size of public employment chosen by shortsighted governments aiming at
maximizing utility of living generations is above the eﬃcient size chosen by
the social planner aiming at an inﬁnite horizon for welfare of all generations.
Optimal funded social security in the form of compulsory saving chosen by
shortsighted governments for living generations’ utility maximization does
not change the ineﬃciently low aggregate saving. A pay-as-you-go pension
system for public employees reduces savings further, and thus abandoning
the pay-as-you-go pension system for public employees and integrating them
into the same compulsory retirement saving system has a positive eﬀect on
savings and growth. The eﬃcient path with investment and labor alloca-
tion to public and production sectors is established in an inﬁnite horizon to
maximize the discounted utility of all generations.
iv
1 Introduction
Almost all countries have instituted social security pension programs for re-
tired populations, either funded social security such as compulsory savings for
retirement or unfunded social security such as Pay-As-You-Go (PAYGO) pension
systems according to ILO (1987). By conventional views, funded social security
programs are neutral when the forced savings are below voluntary savings, and con-
ducive to savings and growth when the forced savings exceed voluntary savings.
On the other hand, unfunded or PAYGO social security programs are typically
viewed as harmful for life-cycle savings and average growth in life-cycle models.
While most countries typically have one type of universal social security pro-
gram (mostly with unfunded systems and a few with funded systems such as Sin-
gapore), China has two types of pension systems existing at the same time for a
few decades. While government employees enjoy a deﬁned beneﬁt PAYGO pen-
sion system for retirement, employees in the production sector may have either
a compulsory saving system for retirement or a PAYGO pension system or both,
depending on the type of enterprise. Most state-owned enterprises in urban areas
have adopted the dual-track plan for employees. But after years of reform, China
has merged the PAYGO system with the compulsory saving system in most major
cities for state-owned enterprises employees. Apart from the case of state-owned
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enterprises, situations diverge. In metropolises like Shanghai, private enterprises
now adopt a fully funded pension system while government employees still enjoy
a deﬁned beneﬁt PAYGO system. In some underdeveloped regions, especially in
rural areas, the social security system has not been completely established for any
kind of employee.
Recently, China has decided to abandon the PAYGO pension system for all
of the government employees and to merge them with employees in the production
sector under the same funded social security system. To analyze the aﬀects of
this integration from the dual-track system, and to simplify the analysis without
essential losses, we assume that all enterprises employees (workers) are under a
compulsory saving system despite the fact that a small fraction of workers in
state-owned enterprises are under a PAYGO pension. One important aspect of the
analysis of the dual-track social security systems and the pension integration is to
examine their eﬀects on aggregate savings and growth, since funded and unfunded
pension programs have diﬀerent impacts on household savings in the literature.
Another useful aspect of this analysis of dual-track social security and its
integration is to investigate labor allocation between the public sector and the
production sector. This sectoral labor allocation is important since new growth
theories argue for a positive scale eﬀect of labor in the production sector on pro-
ductivity and growth. For example, the learning-by-doing growth model of Romer
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(1986), known as the AK model, argues that aggregate investment has spillover
eﬀects on labor skills, so that a larger labor force in production strengthens the
spillovers for higher labor productivity. Unfortunately, existing studies of growth
and social security omit the optimal size of public employment relative to pro-
duction employment. The typical omission of a labor input for public goods and
services is questionable in the presence of a positive scale eﬀect of private employ-
ment in the production sector arising from capital externalities, when there is a
tradeoﬀ between labor used in production and labor used in the public sector. In-
tuitively, the externalities from aggregate capital imply not only underinvestment
in capital but also oversized public employment from the scale eﬀect in an AK
model, which will aﬀect productivity and growth in the economy.
This thesis investigates how the integration of the dual-track social security
systems in China aﬀects capital accumulation, labor allocation between the pro-
duction sector and the public sector, growth, and welfare in an extended AK model
with overlapping generations and externalities from aggregate capital. Since the
allocation of labor and the accumulation of capital interact with the scale eﬀect
in the production sector, this thesis also investigates the optimal size of public
employment. Here, public employees are paid by tax revenue from wage income
to provide utility-enhancing public services. Thus, a higher level of public employ-
ment means a lower level of private employment in the production sector and a
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higher tax rate on income. A lower level of private employment in production for
public employment also weakens the scale eﬀect of labor in production on produc-
tivity or factor returns and growth. Moreover, a higher tax rate on income for
public employment further reduces savings and growth.
When funded or unfunded social security programs aﬀect life-cycle savings,
they also aﬀect marginal products of labor and capital and hence the cost of public
employment for public services in the present model. For instance, when higher
compulsory savings for retirement raises wage levels, it is more costly to use labor
for public services through wage income taxes. Conversely, when a higher pay-as-
you-go pension reduces life-cycle savings, it is less costly to use labor for public
services through wage income taxes.
This thesis makes several contributions. First, the aggregate life-cycle saving
from households in both sectors in equilibrium is found to be below the eﬃcient
level in the presence of capital externalities. Second, the optimal size of public
employment chosen by shortsighted governments aiming at maximizing utility for
living generations is found to be above the eﬃcient size chosen by the social plan-
ner aiming at an inﬁnite horizon for welfare of all generations. Third, optimal
funded social security in the form of compulsory saving chosen by shortsighted
governments for living generations’ utility maximization does not change the in-
eﬃciently low aggregate saving. This is because the equilibrium future interest
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rate is increasing with labor in production but independent of capital stocks from
current savings in an AK model with externalities from aggregate capital. Fourth,
a pay-as-you-go pension system for public employees reduces savings further, and
therefore abandoning the pay-as-you-go pension system for public employees and
integrating them into the same compulsory retirement saving system has a positive
eﬀect on savings and growth. Finally, the eﬃcient path with investment and labor
allocation to public and production sectors is established in an inﬁnite horizon to
maximize the discounted utility of all generations by internalizing the externalities
of aggregate capital. The implementation of the eﬃcient path can be achieved by
downsizing public employment and requiring compulsory savings above the volun-
tary level.
The thesis is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the related literature.
Section 3 introduces the baseline AK model with a production sector and a public
sector that employs labor to provide utility-enhancing public services, and char-
acterizes the decisions by households maximizing life-cycle utility and by ﬁrms
maximizing proﬁts.
Section 4 focuses on equilibrium savings from the population in both sec-
tors and the aggregate accumulation and growth with an exogenous size of public
employees.
Section 5 deals with both equilibrium savings and the optimal size of public
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employment chosen by a shortsighted government to maximize the utility of living
generations.
Section 6 analyzes funded and unfunded social security programs respectively
as well as jointly, along with the optimal size of public employment chosen by a
shortsighted government maximizing the utility of living generations.
Section 7 establishes the eﬃcient path with capital accumulation and labor
allocation between the production sector and the public sector. The eﬃcient path
serves as an eﬃciency criterion to assess the eﬃciency problems of equilibrium
results in all cases with or without shortsighted government optimal policies about
various social security programs for retirement and labor allocation between those
two sectors.
The last section concludes the thesis with discussions of policy implications.
2 Related literature
Social security has been analyzed in a large body of literature for several
decades. Funded social security programs such as compulsory savings are conven-
tionally regarded as neutral when used inframarginally (below voluntary savings),
and as saving promoting when used extramarginally (exceeding voluntary sav-
ings), as shown in Ferrara (1980) and Zhang (1995), among others. Unfunded or
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pay-as-you-go social security programs are more controversial: They are typically
regarded as harmful for life-cycle savings and average growth in life-cycle models
(e.g., Feldstein, 1974; Zhang, 1995), and as neutral in inﬁnite horizon models (e.g.,
Barro, 1974; Zhang, 1995). When fertility is endogenous, unfunded social security
can increase capital intensity and growth by reducing fertility in Becker and Barro
(1988), Zhang (1995), and Yew and Zhang (2009, 2013). However, this fertility
channel does not work in China as the birth control does not allow free choices of
the number of children for parents. Existing studies of social security usually focus
on one type of social security for retirement rather than the dual-track system and
its integration we address here.
To our knowledge, the size of public employment is omitted in existing studies
of capital accumulation in neoclassical growth models (e.g., Solow, 1956; Cass,
1965, Koopmans, 1965) and in endogenous growth models (Romer, 1986, 1990;
Lucas, 1988; Aghion and Howitt, 1992). It is also omitted in existing studies
of government policies in general (e.g. Rebelo, 1991) and of social security in
particular (e.g., Yew and Zhang, 2009; Bruce and Turnovsky, 2013; Yew and Zhang,
2013). Most studies of the public sector for public goods or public capital focus on
the level of utility or productivity enhancing public goods or public capital that
is converted from ﬁnal goods without labor inputs (e.g., Devarajan et al. 1998;
Turnovsky, 2000; Zhang et al., 2008). The sectoral labor allocation is particularly
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important in an AK model in which there is a well-known positive scale eﬀect
from employment in the production sector on productivity and growth through the
externalities of aggregate capital (e.g. Romer, 1986; Barro, 1990; Barro and Sala-
i-Mrtin, 1995; Turnovsky, 2000) or through vertical or horizontal innovation (e.g.
Romer, 1990; Aghion and Howitt, 1992). Given a large public sector with sizable
public employment in modern economies, it is important to study the optimal size
of public employment, particularly because it is associated with the scale eﬀect of
production labor on productivity and growth.
3 The baseline model
The model is an extension of the AK model of Romer (1986) with external-
ities from aggregate capital to include a public sector that converts labor into
utility-enhancing public goods or services Gt in a closed economy with a constant
population of two-period-lived overlapping generations. Each generation has a size
N . The economy consists of households of young and old agents, identical ﬁrms in
the production sector, and the public sector.
There are two types of households in each generation diﬀerentiated by the
sector in which they are employed. Speciﬁcally, a μt ≡ Lt/N fraction of the total
working population are employed in the production sector, where Lt is the number
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of workers in the production sector. Correspondingly, a 1−μt fraction of the total
working population are public employees. Each worker in the production sector
earns a wage wt in return for supplying one unit of labor inelastically.
3.1 Government
The government pays the same wage to hire public employees to provide public
services Gt for the society through a ﬂat-rate tax τt on the wage of both types of
young agents. Thus, the government budget constraint is given as:
wtτt = (1− μt)wt, or (1− τt) = μt. (1)
This inverse relationship between the tax rate and the size of labor in produc-
tion will play an important role in inﬂuencing the productivity and the sectoral
allocation of labor in this AK model with a scale eﬀect from capital externalities.
The provision of public services Gt is proportional to the size of public em-
ployees:
Gt = D(N − Lt), D > 0, (2)
where D indicates the productivity of the public sector. We abstract from public
investment in capital for production as it is typically regarded as less eﬃcient
than subsidization to private investment in capital for production as shown in
the literature (e.g., Devarajan et al., 1998). State owned ﬁrms in China have
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been transformed into corporates operating in the market and their employees
are required to participate in the compulsory pension system as those working in
private ﬁrms.
3.2 Households
Both types of young agents’ preferences are given by the same life-cycle utility
function of life-cycle consumption and public services:
Ut = ln ct + β ln dt+1 + ρ lnGt, 0 < β < 1, 0 < ρ < 1, (3)
where ct is young-age consumption, dt+1 is old-age consumption after retirement,
β indicates the taste (the discounting factor) for utility from old-age consumption,
and ρ indicates the taste for utility from public services that is weaker than the
normalized unitary taste for utility from young-age consumption.
In the baseline model, each young agent saves an amount st in return for
capital income 1+ rt+1 for retirement consumption. The budget constraints of the
agent are:
ct = wt(1− τt)− st, (4)
dt+1 = st(1 + rt+1). (5)
The young agent chooses life-cycle saving st to maximize life-cycle utility Ut in (3),
subject to the budget constraints (4) and (5), taking prices (wt, rt) as given.
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The fraction of wage income saved for retirement is decreasing in the tax rate and
increasing in the taste parameter (the discounting factor) β for utility derived from
retirement consumption. Substituting the optimal saving decision back into the









Both young-age and old-age consumption functions are increasing with the wage
rate and decreasing with the tax rate on labor income. The old-age consumption
function is increasing with the rate of return on saving. A larger discounting factor
reduces young-age consumption and raises old-age consumption, as expected.
3.3 Production





1−α, A > 0, 0 < α < 1, (9)
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where Kit and Lit are respectively the amounts of capital and labor acquired by
the ﬁrm to produce output Yit, and Kt is the total capital stock available at time t
that is external to individual ﬁrms. Assume that capital lasts for one period (full
depreciation) in the production of goods. This assumption is reasonable because
one period corresponds to 40 years in this overlapping-generations model.
Taking the aggregate level of capital Kt and prices as given, the representative




wtLit− (1+rt)Kit in a perfectly competitive market where 1+rt is the rental price
of capital.
The ﬁrst-order conditions of ﬁrms’ maximization proﬁts are:
1 + rt+1 = AαL
1−α
t , (10)
wt = A(1− α)L−αt Kt, (11)
where equal capital intensity Kit/Lit = Kt/Lt holds through competition and
by symmetry because a ﬁrm with a higher level of capital intensity Kit/Lit than
other ﬁrms must have a lower level of the marginal product of capital (hence less
competitive on the capital market) than than other ﬁrms as well. Here, the return
to capital is increasing with the size of labor used in the production sector at
decreasing rates (the scale eﬀect), but it independent of capital stock when all
ﬁrms have equal capital intensity. However, the wage is decreasing in the size of
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labor and proportional to the stock of capital. From (9) and Kit/Lit = Kt/Lt ≡ kt,






which is increasing with capital intensity. In contrast, average output per young







Given capital stock Kt and the size of total working population N , the average
output per young agent is increasing with the size of labor in the production sector
in this extended model with sectoral labor allocations.
In this baseline model of the closed economy, total saving equals total invest-
ment:
Kt+1 = stN. (12)
When there is a compulsory saving system or when there are diﬀerentiated levels
of voluntary savings from workers by sector in later sections in this thesis, this
equilibrium condition will vary accordingly.
To isolate the forces at work, we will focus on one aspect of the extended AK
model at a time in the remaining of this thesis, starting ﬁrst with exogenous labor
allocations between the production and public sectors and then with endogenous
sectoral labor allocations.
13
4 Equilibrium with an exogenous size of public
employees
Given exogenous allocations of labor between the production and public sec-
tors for now, we can ﬁrst focus on the equilibrium accumulation of capital. From
the government budget constraint (1) and the wage equation (11), the equilibrium
wage net of the tax is related to labor and capital in the production sector in the
following way:
wt(1− τt) = A(1− α)L1−αt Kt/N (13)
In contrast to (11), this expression in (13) indicates that the after-tax wage in-
come of both workers in the production sector and public employees increases with
the population of workers in the production sector, Lt, at a decreasing rate, and
proportional to capital stock. In this sense, sectoral allocations of labor interact
with the scale eﬀect of the AK model in such a way that changes the relationship
between wage (productivity) and labor in the production sector.
Substituting these equations (11) and (13 ) back to the functions of st, ct, and



















Here, life-cycle consumption and savings chosen by each agent are increasing with
labor in the production sector at diminishing rate, and increasing with capital per
young agent at a constant rate.
From (12) and (15), capital accumulation in this economy with production





which leads to the growth rate of capital denoted by gkt:




The growth rate of capital is increasing with the size of labor employed in the
production sector at diminishing rates. This positive eﬀect of labor on growth is
coined as the scale eﬀect of population in the literature without public employment.
In the present model with public employment, however, this scale eﬀect is conﬁned
to the size of labor used in the production sector rather than the entire working
population. This scale eﬀect will play an important role in the labor allocation
between the production sector and the public sector by increasing the marginal
beneﬁt of labor in production and the marginal cost of public employment in an
external fashion to agents.
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Output in this AK model is equal to Yt = AL
1−α
t Kt. Clearly, if the amount
of labor in production is constant as in a typical AK model, then output grows at
the same rate of capital accumulation. How can the government optimize the size
of public employment?
5 Equilibrium with an optimal size of public em-
ployment for overlapping generations
Now, we allow the government to maximize the welfare of overlapping genera-
tions living at time t by choosing the size of public employees N−Lt or equivalently
Lt given N :
max
N−Lt
N{ln ct + β ln dt+1 + ρ lnGt + ln dt} (19)
subject to the government budget constraint (1), the technology in providing public
services (2), the resource constraint:
Yt = N(ct + dt + st), (20)




The justiﬁcation of governments maximizing living generations’ utility can emerge
from majority voting or popularity consideration, as typically used in the litera-
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ture on political equilibria with selﬁsh overlapping generations (e.g., Eckstein and
Zilcha, 1994; Zhang et al., 2003). In a later stage, we will consider an inﬁnite
horizon in a social planner problem concerning discounted utility levels of all gen-
erations as the eﬃciency criterion.
Given a state Kt and the choices of individuals as functions of the sectoral
labor allocation, the shortsighted government’s problem of maximizing living gen-
erations’ utility by choice of public employment at time t can be rewritten as :
max
Lt
N{Zt + lnL1−αt + β lnL1−αt + lnL1−αt + ρ ln(N − Lt)}, (21)
where Zt stands for the remaining terms that are independent of Lt and contains
initial capital stock Kt at time t.
The ﬁrst-order necessary condition with respect to Lt is:




N − Lt , (22)
which equates the marginal cost of public employment to the marginal beneﬁt of
public employment as far as the utility of living generations is concerned by the
shortsighted government.




(2 + β)(1− α)
ρ+ (2 + β)(1− α) ∈ (0, 1). (23)
Here, the optimal size of labor in the production sector is increasing with the
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labor share 1 − α in production and the taste (the discounting factor) for utility
from old-age consumption β, but decreasing with the taste for utility from public
services ρ. Accordingly, the optimal solution for the size of public employment is
N − Lt
N
= 1− μ∗ = ρ
ρ+ (2 + β)(1− α) ∈ (0, 1). (24)
This optimal size of public employment increases with the taste ρ for utility from
public services and decreases with the taste for utility from retirement consumption
and with the relative role of labor in production. With the optimal allocation of
labor between the production and public sectors, we are now ready to consider
social security programs in the economy that may diﬀer between these two sectors.
6 Equilibrium with social security programs
In this section, we consider funded social security (compulsory retirement
savings) and unfunded social security to explore their eﬀects on savings, sectoral
labor allocations, and growth. One aim of this investigation is to see whether such
programs can internalize the scale eﬀect from capital externalities in the extended
AK model.
To isolate the forces at work again, we ﬁrst consider funded social security
for exogenous sectoral allocations of labor and then combines it with optimal pub-
lic employment. In the end, we consider the dual-track social security systems
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with funded pensions for workers in the production sector and with pay-as-you-go
pensions for public employees as practiced in China for several decades.
6.1 Compulsory saving or funded social security
In this case the government requires both types pf agents in both the pro-
duction and public sectors to deposit a fraction θt of their income as retirement
savings when they are young. After retirement, both types of agents can consume
the returns to the voluntary and compulsory savings.
The agents’ budget constraints with compulsory retirement savings become
ct = (1− τt − θt)wt − st (25)
dt+1 = (st + θtwt)(1 + rt+1). (26)
For the agents’ own optimization problem, recall that the optimal saving





as in (6). When it is compulsory to save an additional part, as long as compulsory
saving is inframarginal such that




the agents will seek to balance their voluntary saving st and compulsory saving
θtwt to assure that st+θtwt = s
∗
t . In this case the compulsory saving policy aﬀects
only the voluntary saving of an agent at a one-for-one tradeoﬀ with the compulsory
savings.
To explore what the government can do to internalize the externalities from
aggregate capital stock, let us assume extramarginal compulsory saving such that
θt ≥ β(1− τt)
1 + β
.
As the compulsory saving now exceeds agents’ personal optimal saving choice, s∗t ,
voluntary saving will degenerate to 0 for extramarginal compulsory saving. In this
case, agents are forced by extramarginal compulsory retirement savings to have
corner solutions for voluntary retirement savings with st = 0 and
ct = (1− α)AL1−αt
Kt
N








Capital accumulation in this economy in this case with extramarginal com-
pulsory savings evolves according to:
Kt+1 = θtwtN = θtA(1− α)L−αt KtN. (29)
Thus, the rate of capital accumulation equals
Kt+1
Kt
= θtA(1− α)L−αt N. (30)
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and the growth rate of output in this case is equal to:







= θtA(1− α)L−1t L1−αt+1 . (31)
As θt ≥ β(1− τt)/(1 + β), the growth rate of output per young agent in this
case with extramarginal compulsory savings may be higher than or equal to the
growth rate in the previous case without compulsory saving, or with relatively
low compulsory saving rate, depending on the exogenous size of labor used in the
production sector now or in the future.
Can optimal compulsory savings and optimal public employment for living
generations increase aggregate savings to internalize the externalities?
6.2 Optimal public employment and optimal compulsory
saving for living generations
From the economy-wide resource constraint Yt = N(ct + dt + θtwt) and from
(27), we have
dt = Yt/N − ct − θtwt = αAL1−αt Kt. (32)
Notice that this expression is the same as in the case without compulsory saving.
This indicates that a permanent change in the compulsory retirement saving system
starting at time t does not aﬀect the consumption of the retired generation at time
t.
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The shortsighted government’s problem of maximizing the total utility of liv-




N{ln ct+β ln dt+1+ρ lnGt + ln dt} (33)
subject to (27), (28), and (32), given the capital stock Kt. Using the equilibrium
solution for life-cycle consumption and savings, this problem can be rewritten as:
max
Lt,θt
N{Zt+ln(L1−αt N−1−θtL−αt )+β ln θtL−αt +lnL1−αt +ρ ln(N−Lt)} (34)
where the term Zt refers to the remaining terms that are independent of the choice
variables (Lt, θt).
The ﬁrst-order conditions with respect to labor allocation and compulsory






LtN−1 − θt , (35)
Lt :
(1− α)N−1 + αθL−1t








N − Lt . (36)
Equation (35) equates the marginal cost of compulsory savings to the marginal
beneﬁt of compulsory savings. Equation (36) equates the marginal cost of public
employment to the marginal beneﬁt of public employment. In comparison with
(22), the cost of public employment now includes terms associated with compulsory
savings.
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Rearrange these ﬁrst-order conditions, we obtain the solutions for the optimal




(1− α)(2 + β)







Note that the optimal compulsory saving rate for living generations chosen
by the shortsighted government equals the optimal voluntary saving rate by an
individual in (15) in this economy. Consequently, note that the optimal size of
labor in the production sector here with optimal compulsory savings equals the
optimal size of labor in the production sector without compulsory savings in (23).
These results are summarized below.
Proposition 1. The optimal compulsory saving chosen by the shortsighted gov-
ernment to maximize the utility of living generations is the same as the equilibrium
voluntary saving without compulsory savings.
Proposition 2. The optimal public employment chosen by the shortsighted govern-
ment to maximize utility of living generations with optimal compulsory retirement
saving is the same as that without compulsory saving.
The reason for the same results concerning equilibrium savings and labor
allocation between the production and public sectors with optimal compulsory
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retirement savings or without compulsory savings arises from the shortsightedness
of the government for the very living generations of selﬁsh agents. These results
conﬁrm the failure of shortsighted governments aiming at living generations’ utility
in internalizing the externalities from aggregate capital. This suggests the role of
social coordinations in an inﬁnite horizon in internalizing the externalities and
determining public employment, which will be investigated later.
6.3 Dual-track social security systems
Let us now consider the case in which the two types of agents in diﬀerent
sectors have diﬀerent types of pension systems as observed in China for some
decades. Speciﬁcally, there is a compulsory saving or funded social security system
for workers in the production sector, whereas there is a pay-as-you-go or unfunded
pension system for public employees.
The government budget constraint in (1) becomes:
τtwtLt = (N − Lt)wt, (39)
which means a higher tax rate than in (1) to retain the same level of public em-
ployment.
Workers in the production sector with a compulsory saving or funded pension
system have the same budget constraints as in (25) and (26). The wage income
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tax on public employees is now used for their own pay-as-you-go pension:
τtwt(N − Lt) = Bt(N − Lt−1), (40)
where Bt is the pension beneﬁt per retiree for public employees.
Denote the variables of public employees by a superscript g and those of
workers in the production sector by a superscript p. Now, the budget constraints
of public employees become:
cgt = wt(1− τ)− sgt , (41)
dgt+1 = s
g
t (1 + rt+1) + Bt+1. (42)
The accumulation of capital follows an equilibrium condition:
Kt+1 = Lt(s
p
t + θtwt) + (N − Lt)sgt . (43)
The utility maximization decisions of workers in the production sector remain
the same as shown previously. However, the higher tax rate on labor income to
ﬁnance public employees’ wage in (39) means lower savings from workers in the
production sector than that in the previous case. On the other hand, the decisions







ln cgt + β ln d
g
t+1 + ρ lnGt (44)
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subject to (41) and (42). The ﬁrst-order condition with respect to life-cycle savings








The solution from the budget constraints in (41) and (42), and from the ﬁrst-
order condition in (45) is:
sgt =
βwt(1− τt)(1 + rt+1)− Bt+1
(1 + β)(1 + rt+1)
. (46)
Here, life-cycle saving from public employees is decreasing with the the pay-as-
you-go pension beneﬁt as in the literature with pay-as-you-go pensions in life-cycle
models (e.g., Feldstein, 1974; Zhang, 1995).
The results are summarized below.
Proposition 3. Public employees with a pay-as-you-go pension system save less
for retirement than what they would save without such a pension system.
Combining this lower life-cycle saving from public employees with the lower
life-cycle savings of workers in the production sector, the aggregate accumulation
of capital should decline because of the pay-as-you-go pension system for public
employees. From (43) and the AK model’s feature, the growth rate of output
should also decline. In this dual-track social security economy, there is no reduced
form solution for the optimal allocation of labor to the production sector and the
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public sector. Since both types of workers save less than they would in the absence
of pay-as-you-go pensions for public employees, the conclusions on lower aggregate
savings and growth rates are expected to hold.
China has recently announced to abandon the separate pay-as-you-go pension
system for public employees and to integrate them into the same funded pension
system as faced by workers in the production sector. The results here suggest a
rise in the aggregate saving and in the growth rate from this pension integration.
From Propositions 1-3, the failure of shortsighted governments for living gen-
erations’ utility maximization in internalizing the externalities from aggregate cap-
ital in the AK model calls for the consideration of the utility of all generations in
an inﬁnite horizon.
The literature on the internalization of capital externalities is typically based
on a representative agent with inﬁnite life horizon (e.g., Barro and Sala-i-Martin,
1995). In the present model, however, there is selﬁsh agents in overlapping gener-
ations who only consider their life-cycle utility. One important issue of setting up
the social welfare function here is how to assign weights to utility levels of diﬀerent
generations in an inﬁnite horizon. In doing so, we choose the weights as objective
as possible by using the same discounting factor on future utility as that in the
life-cycle utility function.
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7 The eﬃcient path in an inﬁnite horizon
Consider the social planner’s problem in an inﬁnite horizon to maximize utility








βt(ln dt + ln ct + ρ lnGt) (47)
subject to (2), and the following constraints:









Equations (48) and (49) imply the feasibility constraint. In (48) and (49), the
social planner recognizes the AK structure of this model with overlapping genera-
tions when it allocates labor’s share of output to young agents and capital’s share
to retirees, allocates labor to the two sectors, and makes investment from young
agents. Comparing them with the previous sections, the social planner directly
chooses the sequence of investment and the allocation of labor in the production
and public sectors for all generations, including the living ones and unborn gener-
ations at an individual and aggregate levels, to internalize the externalities from
aggregate capital.
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Equation (50) is the intratemporal Euler equation equalizing the marginal cost
and beneﬁt of sectoral labor allocation. Equation (51) is the intertemporal Euler
equation equalizing the marginal cost and beneﬁt of investment.
From the log utility, proportional allocations of time and income are expected
to be constant over time: Lt = Lt+1 = L






ρ(1− β) + 2(1− α) ∈ (0, 1), (52)
Kt+1 =
[ρL∗ − 2(1− α)(N − L∗)]
[ρL∗ − (1− α(N − L∗)] (1− α)A(L
∗)1−αKt. (53)
Is the eﬃcient level of labor in production higher or lower than the equilibrium
level of labor in production? Accordingly, is the eﬃcient level of public employment
higher or lower than the equilibrium level of public employment? Such questions
are important in the AK model with a scale eﬀect from the level of labor in
production, concerning productivity, growth, and welfare.
Proposition 4. The eﬃcient level of labor in production is higher than the equi-
librium level of labor in production. Accordingly, the eﬃcient size of public em-
ployment is lower than the equilibrium size of public employment.
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Proof. From (23) or (37) and (52), the level of eﬃcient labor in production minus




(1− β)ρ+ 2(1− α) −
(2 + β)(1− α)
ρ+ (2 + β)(1− α)
]
= ρβ(1 + β) > 0.
As is well known in the literature, the AK model with externalities from
aggregate capital has a scale eﬀect in the sense that a large labor force in production
increases labor productivity. The social planner facing an inﬁnite planning horizon
internalizes this scale eﬀect from aggregate capital externalities. Thus, in the
AK style model with a scale eﬀect of labor in production, the equilibrium size of
labor in production is below the eﬃcient level and the equilibrium size of public
employment is above the eﬃcient level of public employment. This result has
useful policy implications to downsize public employment, as modern governments
employ a large size of labor for public services.
From the inverse relationship between the tax rate and the level of labor in
production in (1), which is incorporated in the constraint (48), the fact that the
equilibrium public employment is oversized means that the tax rate on labor in-
come is higher than the eﬃcient level. Thus, it is eﬃciency enhancing to downsize
equilibrium public employment and to reduce the tax rate on labor income accord-
ingly.
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Are the eﬃcient levels of capital accumulation and growth rates higher or
lower than the equilibrium levels?
Proposition 5. The eﬃcient levels of capital accumulation and growth rates are
higher than the equilibrium levels.
Proof. From (6), (13), (38), and (53), the eﬃcient rate of capital accumulation
minus the voluntary saving rate or the optimal compulsory saving rate for living
generations is signed by:
sign
[
ρL∗ − 2(1− α)(N − L∗)




= ρβ(1 + β) > 0,
where L∗ is based on (52). This also conﬁrms that the eﬃcient capital accumulation
rate is positive. From Proposition 4, the eﬃcient labor allocation remains time
invariant, the eﬃcient growth rate of output must be higher than the equilibrium
growth rate, following the result for capital accumulation in this AK model.
The result here indicates that the equilibrium saving rates are below the ef-
ﬁcient level, regardless of whether they are voluntarily determined or optimally
chosen as compulsory for living generations’ utility maximization. This equilib-
rium underinvestment in capital originates from the externalities of capital, which
is found in Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1995) without public employment. In this
AK model, the higher eﬃcient than equilibrium saving also implies higher eﬃcient
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than equilibrium growth. This underinvestment and slower growth can be partly
mitigated by requiring all young agents to save more than they do voluntarily via
extramarginal compulsory saving. The result here involves an endogenously de-
termined labor allocation to production and public sectors rather than exogenous
working population in production in existing AK models.
8 Conclusion
In an AK model , this thesis has studied the optimal savings and the optimal
labor allocation between the production sector and the public sector with funded or
unfunded social security or both. The present investigation makes several contri-
butions to the literature by linking the scale eﬀect of the AK model to the optimal
size of public employment and various social security programs.
First, the positive scale eﬀect of labor in production from externalities of
aggregate capital implies not only underinvestment in capital as in the literature
but also oversized public employment even if it is chosen optimally by shortsighted
governments for utility maximization of living generations. Second, optimal funded
social security chosen by shortsighted governments aiming at maximizing utility of
living generations is equal to equilibrium savings chosen voluntarily by individuals.
Finally, it has established the eﬃcient path with investment in capital and
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labor allocation to the production sector and the public sector in an inﬁnite hori-
zon. The eﬃcient path for utility maximization of all generations fully internalizes
the externalities from aggregate capital and conﬁrms the eﬃciency losses of the
equilibrium outcome concerning investment, sectoral labor allocation, and growth.
The study here sheds light on policy issues. If the externalities from aggregate
capital indeed exist as claimed by researchers using AK models,1 then governments
should downsize public employment and raise saving above the voluntary levels for
retirement. Doing so improves not only aggregate output from the production
sector but also productivity and growth through the scale eﬀect of labor used in
the production sector in the AK model. In addition, downsizing public employ-
ment reduces the tax rate on wage income, which improves competitiveness of the
private sector. Funded social security should be set at a higher compulsory saving
rate above the equilibrium level of voluntary savings for higher savings to mitigate
the eﬃciency loss of the externalities. Moreover, abandoning unfunded social secu-
rity for public employment and integrating public employees to the funded social
security in China should raise aggregate savings and the growth rate, as well as
welfare for all generations.
1See evidence for learning-by-doing as justiﬁcation for AK models in Wright (1936), Rapping
(1965), and Schmookler (1966).
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